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THE CHALLENGES OF FOLLOWING GOOD ADVICE ABOUT 
COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
ALFRED C. YEN* 
Judge  McKeown’s  perceptive essay  describes  how the  use  of 
“copyright as censorship”1 threatens free speech in a way that copyright has 
not before. Accordingly, Judge McKeown argues that courts should apply 
careful  First  Amendment scrutiny to lawsuits in  which the  plaintiff sues 
under copyright, not to protect the commercial value of a copyright, but to 
accomplish censorship. The clear implication is that many of these claims 
should fail.2  She exhorts  professors, students, and advocates to think 
through the implications  of  her  observation.3  I  would like to respond to 
Judge  McKeown  by suggesting that  her advice can truly influence the 
future  of copyright  only if judges take the advice to  heart—even to the 
point of discrediting some existing case law. 
Copyright as censorship  differs from  ordinary copyright,  not in the 
form  of the complaint,  but in the reasons for  bringing a lawsuit.   This 
distinction gives Judge McKeown’s argument considerable force. Ordinary 
copyright  plaintiffs sue to  protect incentives to create.   This connects 
directly to the utilitarian purposes for copyright—namely promotion of the 
arts—and justifies  why  protecting the  plaintiff’s interests is  worth the 
potential loss  of speech.4 If copyright law  prohibits the  defendant from 
speaking (i.e. creating  or  disseminating an alegedly infringing  work),  we 
lose the defendant’s speech.  However, society gains because we preserve 
the economic incentives that spurred the  plaintiff’s creation in the first 
place.   Without these incentives,  neither the  plaintiff’s  original  work  nor 
the  defendant’s  derivative speech  would  have existed anyway.   Society 
 
 *  Associate  Dean  of  Faculty and  Professor  of  Law,  Boston  Colege  Law  School.   Copyright 
2016 by Alfred C. Yen. 
 1.  See Hon.  M.  Margaret  McKeown, Censorship in the  Guise  of  Authorship:  Harmonizing 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2015). 
 2.  See id. 
 3.  Id. at 16–17. 
 4.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass copyright laws “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts”); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
471 U.S. 539, 558 (1997) (explaining purpose of copyright is to stimulate creation of new works); Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (explaining purpose of 
copyright is to promote the progress of art). 
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therefore  has some comfort that in these situations, copyright is speech 
enhancing.5 
By contrast, censoring  plaintiffs  do  not  use copyright to  protect 
copyright incentives.  Instead, they sue to  protect  personal interests that 
bear litle relation to income streams associated  with the exploitation  of 
copyright rights.   For example, censoring  plaintiffs sue to silence speech 
they consider  distasteful,6 to  protect  privacy,7 or to avoid  public ridicule.8 
In these situations, censoring the defendant’s speech does litle to preserve 
the plaintiff’s incentives to create. Enforcing the plaintiff’s copyright claim 
therefore  does  nothing to ensure creation  of the  plaintiff’s  work.   Society 
loses the  defendant’s speech,  but it is  unlikely that incentives for  other 
speech offset this loss. Accordingly, it makes sense to worry that copyright 
as censorship reduces speech. 
If we accept the proposition that courts should reject copyright claims 
brought for the  wrong reasons, it is  quite likely that some copyright 
claimants  wil try to  hide their  motives.   They  wil sue for reasons  of 
censorship,  but  pretend that they  want to  protect incentives.   Although 
some pretexts wil be easy to identify, courts folowing Judge McKeown’s 
advice  wil eventualy find cases  where the reasons for the  plaintiff’s suit 
are  unclear.   How courts  handle these ambiguous situations  wil  greatly 
affect  how  much the  First  Amendment restrains copyright claims  of 
doubtful value. 
To get a sense of this, let us consider some law borrowed from another 
First  Amendment area involving  motive—namely, the regulation  of  non-
obscene adult entertainment.   Because this speech is  not  obscene, it 
receives ful First Amendment protection.9 Nevertheless, local hostility to 
 
 5.  See Melvile Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech 
and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186 (1970); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 
70 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 991 (1970). 
 6.  See New  Era  Publications Intern.,  v.  Carol  Pub. Group,  904  F.2d  152 (2d  Cir.  1990) 
(copyright suit to enjoin publication of book portraying founder of Scientology in unflatering terms); 
New  Era  Publications Intern.,  v.  Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  873  F.2d  576,  579 (2d.  Cir.  1989) (addressing a 
copyright lawsuit against publishers of biography criticizing founder of Scientology). 
 7.  See Monge  v.  Maya  Magazines, Inc., 688  F.3d  1164,  1177 (9th  Cir.  2012) (addressing a 
copyright lawsuitsuit against  magazine that  published  photos  of a secret celebrity  wedding); Bond  v. 
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) (dealing with a copyright lawsuit to prevent use of plaintiff’s 
unpublished book manuscript in a court proceeding because manuscript contained facts unfavorable to 
plaintiff); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (bringing a copyright lawsuit 
to enjoin publication of book about Salinger because book paraphrased Salinger’s unpublished leters). 
 8.  See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (actress bringing suit to remove 
movie from YouTube because her role in movie exposed her to threats and ridicule). 
 9.  See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 251(2002) (holding First Amendment 
protects speech that is neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse); Schad v. Borough of Mount 
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (“Nor may an entertainment program be prohibited solely because it 
displays the nude human figure. ‘Nudity alone’ does not place otherwise protected material outside the 
mantle of the First Amendment.”). 
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adult entertainment sometimes encourages  municipalities to  ban  or 
otherwise limit adult entertainment in  ways  different from  other 
entertainment.10  Those  who run adult  businesses  often chalenge such 
regulation on First Amendment grounds.11 
Courts generaly assess the constitutionality of laws regulating speech 
by asking  whether the law is content-based.12  According to the  Supreme 
Court, a law is content-based if it “applies to particular speech because of 
the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”13 Courts apply strict 
scrutiny to content-based regulation of speech, which generaly leads to a 
finding of unconstitutionality.14 By contrast, lower levels of scrutiny apply 
to laws that are  not content-based.   Courts are  more likely to find these 
“content-neutral” regulations constitutional,  because they  only affect 
speech incidentaly.15  This distinction makes sense because content-based 
regulations imply that the government has chosen to suppress one message 
while favoring others.16 
 
 10.  See Charles D. Perry, Since 2013, Horry County Spent More Than $200K Regulating Adult 
Entertainment, MYRTLEBEACHONLINE, Jan.  30,  2016,  htp:/www.myrtlebeachonline.com/news/ 
local/article57380153.html; Janet  Begley, Felsmere  Approves  Ordinances  Regulating  Adult 
Entertainment, TCPALM,  Aug.  7,  2015,  htp:/www.tcpalm.com/news/felsmere-approves-ordinances-
regulating-adult-entertainment-ep-1220195554-332115052.html; Waterford  Ordinance to  Regulate 
Adult  Entertainment, YOURERIE.COM (last  updated  Nov.  5,  2014), 
htp:/www.yourerie.com/news/news/waterford-ordinance-to-regulate-adult-entertainment. 
 11.  See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2015) (suit contending that zoning 
and licensing ordinances preventing operation of adult-entertainment clubs featuring semi-nude dancing 
violated First Amendment); Entertainment Productions, Inc. v. Shelby County, 721 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 
2013) (suit arguing that local ordinance regulating adult-entertainment establishments violated the First 
Amendment);  Peek-A-Boo  Lounge  of  Bradenton, Inc.  v.  Manatee  County,  630  F.3d  1346 (11th  Cir. 
2011) (action claiming that  ordinance regulating sexualy  oriented  businesses  violated  First 
Amendment); Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(plaintiff successfuly claiming that city zoning bylaws violated First Amendment); Encore Videos, Inc. 
v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2003) (suit claiming that ordinance regulating 
adult-entertainment businesses violated First Amendment). 
 12.  See City of Ladue v. Gileo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The normal 
inquiry that our doctrine dictates is, first, to determine whether a regulation is content based or content 
neutral . . . .”). 
 13.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
 14.  See id. at  2227 (holding content-based laws  must satisfy strict scrutiny);  Sorrel  v. IMS 
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (“[I]t is al but dispositive to conclude that a law is content-
based”);  R.A.V.  v.  City  of  St.  Paul, 505  U.S.  377,  382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid”). 
 15.  See City  of  Renton  v.  Playtime  Theatres,  475  U.S.  41,  49 (1986) (content  neutral laws 
reviewed as time,  place, and  manner restrictions);  Virginia  St.  Bd.  of  Pharmacy  v. Virginia  Citizens 
Consumer  Council, Inc., 425  U.S.  748,  771 (1976) (content-neutral regulation is constitutional if it 
serves significant government interest and leaves open alternative channels for speech). 
 16.  See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (government “has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject mater, or its content”); Town of Gilbert, 
135 S. Ct. at 2226–27 (government has no power to restrict speech based upon message conveyed). 
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To see this, consider first a city  ordinance  prohibiting the  display  of 
any sign tending to bring a foreign government into public disrepute. This 
law singles  out speech for suppression  on the  basis  of its content, and it 
strongly suggests that the  ordinance exists to censor  politicaly 
controversial speech.   Such  behavior is surely  odious to the  First 
Amendment.17 
By contrast, consider  next a law that  prohibits “any congregation  of 
three  or  more  persons  within  500 feet  of a foreign embassy.”18  This 
ordinance  might restrict speech activity (perhaps  by  preventing  numerous 
sign-holders from standing near a foreign embassy), but it is less likely to 
violate the  First  Amendment  because it  does  not  discriminate against 
speakers on the basis of their content.19 This suggests a benign motive for 
the regulation, such as  public safety,20 thereby  weakening any  First 
Amendment chalenge. 
The foregoing implies that the  First  Amendment  prohibits laws that 
single out adult entertainment for unfavorable treatment, and indeed, many 
cases reach this  precise conclusion.21 However, some  municipalities  have 
realized that they may be able to avoid First Amendment strict scrutiny by 
claiming that they did not enact seemingly content-based ordinances for the 
purpose of censoring adult entertainment. This involves the contention that 
the  government  has  moved to regulate secondary effects associated  with 
adult entertainment, and not the speech itself.22 
In  perhaps the  most  wel  known  of these cases, the  City  of  Renton 
passed a zoning law that restricted adult  businesses to certain  highly 
 
 17.  See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (provision making it unlawful to display within 
500 of a foreign embassy any sign tending to bring the foreign government into “public disrepute” is 
content-based regulation violating the First Amendment). 
 18.  Id. at 315. 
 19.  Id. at 329–32 (provision making it unlawful “to congregate within 500 feet of any [embassy, 
legation,  or consulate] and refuse to  disperse after  having  been  ordered so to  do  by the  police” is 
constitutional). 
 20.  Id. at 331. 
 21.  See Schad v.  Borough  of  Mount  Ephraim,  452  U.S.  61 (1981) (holding that a  municipality 
may not prohibit nude dancing); Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61 (1st 
Cir.  2014) (finding zoning  bylaws regulating adult entertainment establishments unconstitutional); 
R.V.S.  v.  City  of  Rockford,  361  F.3d  402 (7th  Cir.  2004) (holding  ordinance requiring certain adult 
entertainment establishments to obtain special use permits unconstitutional); Wil-Kar, Inc. v. Vilage of 
Germantown,  153  F.  Supp.  2d  982 (E.D.  Wisc.  2001) (finding law requiring adult establishments to 
obtain special license is content-based and  unconstitutional);  Clarkson  v.  Town  of  Florence,  198  F. 
Supp. 2d 997 (E.D. Wisc. 2002) (holding prohibition against nude dancing unconstitutional); 
 22.  See Young v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 71–73 (1976) (accepting argument that 
zoning law imposing special rules on adult theaters atempted to preserve character of neighborhoods 
and  not censor speech);  City  of  Renton  v.  Playtime  Theatres,  475  U.S.  41,  48 (1986) (accepting 
contention that zoning  ordinance singling  out adult  businesses for less favorable treatment tried to 
prevent crime, protect trade, maintain property values, and preserve the quality of neighborhoods). 
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undesirable locations.23  This  made it  difficult to  open a  viable adult 
business, and  Playtime  Theaters sued.24  On its face,  Renton’s zoning 
would appear to  be content-based regulation.   The law singled  out a 
specific form of entertainment for treatment less favorable than other non-
adult  businesses received.25  It is therefore easy to conclude that the law 
was simply an effort to suppress adult speech—a classic form  of 
censorship. 
The City of Renton responded to this problem by claiming that it did 
not intend to suppress adult speech.   The city claimed instead that it  was 
trying to  prevent crime  by regulating the  placement  of  businesses that 
contributed to these problems.26 This benign purpose alowed the Court to 
review Renton’s law without using strict scrutiny, and this led to a finding 
of constitutionality.27 
For purposes of my essay, it is important to understand that the Court 
could  have rejected  Renton’s argument as a red  herring  designed to 
camouflage  deliberate censorship.   After al, it is  difficult to imagine that 
Renton  did  not  know and approve  of  what its zoning  would  do to adult 
businesses.   Forcing  Renton to justify these effects  under strict scrutiny 
would have sent an important signal to municipalities that atempts to hide 
censorship would  probably fail.   The result  would  have  been a relatively 
strong barrier against deliberate suppression of speech. 
By agreeing  with  Renton and  holding the zoning constitutional, the 
Supreme Court greatly weakened the ability of the content-based/content-
neutral  distinction to  prevent  purposeful censorship  of speech.   Now, any 
time that the  government engages in content-based regulation, it can 
consider  hiding that censorship  underneath an argument that the true 
purpose  was to avoid some  more  generalized social il.   These arguments 
may  not always succeed,  but to the extent they  occasionaly  do, they 
embolden those  who  would censor and  make it  harder for  victims  of 
censorship to get relief. 
I  believe that courts trying to folow Judge  McKeown’s advice  will 
encounter similar chalenges in copyright.  Indeed, it is  prety clear that 
judges  have already confronted cases involving  disguised censorship, and 
 
 23.  City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 44 (1986). 
 24.  Id. at  53 (noting  plaintiffs’ contention there  were  no commercialy  viable sites for an adult 
theater in Renton, although Supreme Court disagreed). 
 25.  Id. at 44. 
 26.  See id. at 48 (finding that city acted for purpose of preventing crime, protecting business, and 
preserving property values). 
 27.  Id. at  49–55 (reviewing  ordinance as time,  place, and  manner restriction and finding 
ordinance constitutional). 
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they  have sometimes failed to  use the  First  Amendment the  way Judge 
McKeown suggests. 
For example, in Salinger v. Random House, the defendant paraphrased 
a number of J.D. Salinger’s unpublished leters as part of a biography about 
the author.28  Salinger sued for copyright infringement, and the defendant 
countered  with a claim  of fair  use.29  Judge  McKeown’s  observations 
strongly suggest that  Salinger should  have lost this case.   He  had  no 
intention of publishing his leters,30 so any connection to the preservation of 
copyright incentives was weak.  Additionaly,  Salinger  was a  wel-known 
recluse31 who took aggressive action to  keep  people from  writing about 
him.32  Despite this, Salinger prevailed.33  Moreover, in ruling against fair 
use, the  Second  Circuit claimed that the  preservation  of copyright 
incentives was an important reason for its decision.34 
A prominent case like Salinger could considerably blunt the force of 
Judge McKeown’s advice.  To me, Salinger was the kind of plaintiff who 
Judge  McKeown thinks should fail.   Accordingly, the  Second  Circuit’s 
decision stands for the proposition that speculative claims about copyright 
incentives should prevail, even when plaintiffs have prety clear censorship 
motivations.   Granted, there are cases that stand for the  opposite 
proposition—namely, that copyright  does  not favor atempts to censor.35 
Nevertheless, Salinger’s continued  presence as “good law” emboldens 
those who wish to censor by providing a legal roadmap for circumventing 
First Amendment concerns about censorship.36 
 
 28.  811 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 29.  Id. at 94. 
 30.  Id. at  99 (noting  Salinger  disavowed any intention  of  publishing the leters  during  his 
lifetime). 
 31.  See Vanishing  Act: J.D.  Salinger, TIME.COM,  htp:/content.time.com/time/specials/ 
packages/article/0,28804,1902376_1902378,00.html (last visited February 7, 2016) (listing Salinger as 
one of the top 10 most reclusive celebrities). 
 32.  See W.W., Copywrongs: J.D.  Salinger’s  miserly legal legacy, THE ECONOMIST, Jan.  17, 
2011,  htp:/www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/01/copywrongs (last  visited  February  7, 2016) 
(describing Salinger’s “litigious streak” and lawsuits brought by Salinger). 
 33.  811 F.2d at 100 (finding Salinger was entitled to preliminary injunction). 
 34.  Id. at  99 (identifying  Salinger’s  potential change  of  mind about  publishing  his leters in 
measuring effect of defendant’s use on the market for Salinger’s leters). 
 35.  See New  Era  Publ’ns Int’l,  ApS  v.  Carol  Publ’g Group,  904  F.2d  152 (2d  Cir.  1990) 
(addressing copyright suit to enjoin  publication  of  book  portraying founder  of  Scientology in 
unflatering terms);  Shloss  v.  Sweeney,  515  F.  Supp.  2d  1068 (N.D.  Cal.  2007) (refusing to  dismiss 
declaratory relief action against  defendant accused  of  using threat  of copyright action to censor  book 
about James Joyce). 
 36.  For an example  of Salinger’s influence, consider the case  of New  Era  Publications, 
International ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), in which the Second Circuit 
found valid a copyright claim brought by a plaintiff against the author and publisher of an unflatering 
biography.   Although the force  of this finding  was largely  blunted  by the application  of laches, the 
apparent acceptance of using copyright for censorship remains. 
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The foregoing shows that, for al its conceptual  power, Judge 
McKeown’s prescription wil have, or could have, fairly minimal influence 
over copyright law  unless courts recognize that they  must  be skeptical 
when plaintiffs claim not to have censorship motives. If they fail to apply 
such skepticism and discredit precedent like Salinger, plaintiffs who want 
to censor  wil sue for copyright infringement,  because the  possibility  of a 
Salinger-type result creates, at the  very least, leverage for a censorship-
friendly setlement. 
Personaly, I think that such an  outcome  would  be  unfortunate. 
Copyright already has frequently been extended at the expense of speech, 
and I think that these extensions have brought relatively litle incentive for 
creation in return.37 Judge McKeown’s observations are important because 
they hold the potential for limiting, or even reversing, such developments. 
I hope that future courts heed her advice. 
 
 
 37.  See Eldred  v.  Ashcroft,  537  U.S.  186,  243-266 (2003) (Breyer, J.,  dissenting) (identifying 
how copyright term extension creates effectively no incentive for creation of new works). 
